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Synonyms 
(approx.) boundary condition, control 
 
 
Definition 
Constraint refers to a reduction on the degrees of freedom of the elements of a system exerted 
by some collection of elements, or a limitation or bias on the variability or possibilities of 
change in the kind of such elements.  
Although it has several meanings in diverse scientific fields, the idea of constraint is usually 
employed in relation to conceptualizations in terms of levels or hierarchies. Some general 
features of constraints such understood are the following: constraints do not interact with the 
elements they influence and their dynamics; they arise from dynamics at different levels of 
organization; constraint relations are always asymmetric, and may give rise to new 
phenomena.  
In the tradition of the theories of emergent evolution of the early XXth century and, even 
clearer, in the theory of levels of integration of the organicist tradition of the 30s, higher 
levels are understood as arising from lower level elements or processes, whose laws all obey, 
but concurrently exerting some specific influence on those very elements or processes (see 
Blitz 1992). Later on, in most approaches to hierarchy theory, the very concept of constraint is 
profusely used to account for the specificity of non-trivial inter-level relation where lower 
level and upper level act upon each other but in different ways (see, i.e., Allen & Starr 1982, 
Salthe 1985). Even the introduction of some specific senses of constraint in evolutionary 
biology (as developmental constraints and historical constraints) is due to the attempt to 
accommodate different explanations, stemming from diverse factors or forces and potentially 
alternative, if not rival, to adaptive selection, in an unavoidably multilevel explanatory 
construction. 
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Characteristics 
The development of more specific characterizations of constraint (or alike) are attempts to 
spell out the interaction among levels of organization by deriving them from 
epistemologically legitimate concepts grounded in the physical sciences or in their 
explanatory armory.  
The difficult issue of interlevel relation is rendered more concrete by Polanyi’s (1968) 
account of organisms (and machines) as dual control systems, which relies on an indistinct 
concept of boundary conditions. Polanyi deliberately employs the machine example to 
introduce his idea of boundary conditions “harnessing the laws of nature” that govern matter 
and the forces acting on it. In a machine, the harnessing is exerted with a goal, which makes 
easier to describe the dual control: the design of the machine, by which the machine does 
what it is intended for, and the laws of physics and chemistry, that the components of the 
machine and the machine itself must obey.  
In the organism “its structure serves as a boundary condition harnessing the physical-chemical 
processes by which its organs perform their functions” (p. 1308). The machine analogy goes 
on to compare morphogenesis, as the process that develops that structure, with the shaping of 
the machine. Yet, as Polanyi emphasizes, the analogy ends here: although both are systems 
under dual control (unlike inanimate systems which may exhibit boundary conditions without 
being subject to dual control), organisms are not artificially designed. Therefore the 
harnessing principle in organisms has to be autonomous, task that Polanyi attributes to the 
informational account of heredity. 
Is precisely this the challenge that Pattee (see, i.e., 1968, 1970) undertakes in his research on 
the origin of life and the nature of biological function and heredity, using the concept of 
constraint as an explanatory tool derived from Mechanics. He develops in several papers the 
concept and the relevant distinction between holonomic (structural-like) and non-holonomic 
(functional-like) kinds. Pattee claims that, in order to explain hereditary storage, transmission 
and the action of genetic instructions, we should understand them in terms of non-holonomic 
constraints acting in the context of a very specific kind of interlevel relation (semantic 
closure). 
Following his description we may recall that, in Physics, initial conditions and laws of 
movement provide, in principle, an exhaustive description of the possible behavior, future and 
past, of a mechanical system. No other conditions are needed. The choice of the coordinates 
of the system that specifies its space of configuration or space of states, defines all the 
possible degrees of freedom in the system or all the possible trajectories of movement of its 
elements. These coordinates establish the variables of the movement equations of the system. 
In this context, constraints are those additional equations that are introduced as auxiliary 
conditions in order to define the specific mechanical system subject to calculation (see, i.e. 
Sommerfeld 1952). In other areas of Physics, constraints may be expressed in a more general 
form as boundary conditions. In Chemistry, constraints refer to the steady state of elementary 
particles (chemical bonds). When referred to dissipative systems the concept acquires an even 
more specific sense as it becomes dynamical (an unstable macroscopic pattern that remains as 
long as there is energy contribution). Finally, its presence is patent in any form of biological 
regulation (starting from a membrane) and more controversial in its contribution to the 
understanding of evolutionary paths. In social and artificial systems is clearly manifested in 
the form of rules. In sum, constraints refer to certain conditions or rules additional to the laws 
of dynamics (that are taken as basic), that rule/govern the behavior of the elements and that 
arise from the aggregation of those.  
Whereas natural laws are, in principle, inexorable and incorporeal, constraints are, by 
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necessity, accidental or arbitrary, and require some distinct physical materialization (as 
molecules, membranes or surfaces). Constraints are alternative descriptions of part of the 
system. Namely, constraints cannot be expressed in the same language than the microscopic 
description of matter. In fact, what a constraint does is to selectively ignore microscopic 
degrees of freedom in order to obtain a simplification in the prediction or explanation of 
movement. The concept of constraint means a selective loose of detail or a predetermined rule 
about what is going to be ignored.  
Therefore, for Physics constraining forces are, unavoidably, linked to a new hierarchical level 
of description. When in Physics a constraint equation is added to the equations of movement, 
we are always dealing with two languages at the same time. The language of the equation of 
movement relates the detailed trajectory or the state of the system with dynamical time, 
whereas the language of the constraint does not deal at all with the same kind of system, but 
with another situation in which the dynamical detail has been purposely ignored. In other 
words, constriction forces are not detailed forces of the individual particles but forces of the 
collections of particles or, sometimes, forces of simple units averaged out in time. In any case, 
some form of statistical averaging process has substituted microscopic detail. In Physics, then, 
in order to describe a constraint, the detailed dynamical description has to be abandoned. A 
constraint requires, therefore, an alternative description.  
Another relevant contribution to naturalize the concept of constraint in the biological domain 
has been provided by theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman, who has recently proposed the 
idea of the “Work-Constraint cycle” (Kauffman 2000; 2003). The Work-Constraint cycle is 
supposed to capture what Kauffman takes as a central feature of all biological organisms, 
namely the fact of acting “on their own behalf” (Kauffman 2003, 1089). Whereas this idea 
appears to be in accordance with common intuition, Kauffman’s scientific challenge consists 
in giving a naturalized and consistent account of it. The concept of Work-Constraint cycle 
plays precisely this role. The main idea is to link the idea of action to that of ‘work’, the latter 
being defined, following Atkins, as “constrained release of energy into relatively few degrees 
of freedom” (Kauffman 2003, 1094). In this definition, the concepts of work and constraints 
are related: work is constrained release of energy. This connection gives a way to interpret the 
slogan acting “on their own behalf.” A system acts on its own behalf if it is able to use its 
work to re-generate at least some of the constraints that make work possible. When this 
occurs, a Work-Constraint cycle is realized. In physical terms, it requires very specific 
conditions to occur. Actually, the cycle is inevitably a thermodynamic irreversible process, 
which dissipates energy and requires couplings between exergonic (spontaneous, which 
release energy) reactions and endergonic (non spontaneous, which require energy) ones, such 
that exergonic processes are constrained in a specific way to produce a work that may be used 
to generate endergonic processes, which in turn generate those constraints canalizing 
exergonic processes. In Kauffman’s terms, “Work begets constraints beget work” (Kauffman 
2000).  
In evolutionary biology the concept of constraint has mainly been introduced as a challenge 
by developmental approaches regarding the scope of selection and the extent to which 
adaptation remains the main explanatory factor (see developmental explanation). Besides the 
specific issue of connecting developmental with evolutionary accounts, the concept of 
constraint plays an important role, for instance, in the criticisms to adaptationism, in the 
discussion regarding the relevance of stasis and other macroevolutionary patterns, or in the 
morphologically oriented proposals of structuralism or complexity theories (see Orzack & 
Sober 2001).  
In an already classic paper that may be considered to be an attempt to build a “consensus” 
position on the subject, a developmental constraint is defined as “a bias on the production of 
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variant phenotypes or a limitation on phenotypic variability caused by the structure, character, 
composition, or dynamics of the developmental system” (Maynard Smith et al 1985, 266). 
The origin of this bias or limitation may be attributed to various sources (materiality, genetic 
dynamics, evolutionary pathways, complexity regime) but what is agreed upon is that they 
have an impact in evolution. A distinction is also drawn between universal constraints, 
deriving from general laws of physics or from invariant properties of some material or 
complex systems, and local constraints, confined to particular taxa.  
Amundson (1994), while accepting that constraint “implies some sort of restriction on variety 
or on change”, claims that the key rests on the answer to the question regarding “what is being 
constrained”. Thus, he identifies two possible answers depending on whether the 
explanandum is adaptation or form. We would therefore have to distinguish between 
understanding the effect of developmental principles on evolution as constraints on 
adaptation, i.e. as restrictions imposed by embryology on the adaptive optimality of adult 
organisms on the potential of adaptation, or constraints on form, in the sense that in the 
morphospace there are morphologies that cannot be achieved by the process of development.  
This distinction is orthogonal to the previous one between local and universal kinds of 
constraints since both of them may operate, irrespectively, on the prospects on reaching more 
optimal adaptations and on the scope of generation of organic form.  
Sometimes, other kinds of constraints are mentioned in the context of contending 
evolutionary explanations, eve if they are not generally accepted as specific constraints. For 
instance, historical constraints are often brought up to contrast with developmental ones 
though maintaining the same feature of imposing restriction on adaptation, but they are due to 
more “evolutionary” common factors such as contingency or accident creating some kind of 
bias. Ecological constraints can also be sometimes evoked.  
Regarding these uses and besides those distinctions about how to understand the concept, 
there is another point worth mentioning since it allows connecting the concept of 
developmental constraint with the more general idea defined in the beginning of this entry. 
According to Schwenk & Wagner (2003) this collective definition highlights the separation 
between constraint and selection by distinguishing the “generation of variation from the 
operation of selection on that variation” (p. 54). In this sense, the force of selection would 
assume here the role of the general law upon which some rules are imposed and, therefore, we 
my say that, here too, some potential degrees of freedom are reduced due to what Polanyi was 
calling boundary conditions and Pattee constraints in their more general approaches.  
 
Cross-References 
Adaptation 
Autonomy 
Complexity 
Constraint, developmental 
Constraint, holonomic 
Constraint, nonholonomic 
Explanation, developmental 
Explanation, evolutionary 
Explanation, functional 
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Function 
Hierarchy 
Inter-level causation 
Organization 
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